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Note
No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from
Trademark-Infringing Domain Name Parking
Elizabeth M. Flanagan∗
Over 128 million domain names—the worldwide web addresses most familiar to Internet users—are currently registered across the globe.1 Instead of adding value and diversity to
the Internet, however, many of these registered domain names
amount to nothing more than nuisance sites that annoy and
discourage Internet users and frustrate trademark owners. A
significant number of registered domain names link to websites
brimming with advertisements or pay-per-click links.2 It should
be no surprise that money fuels the domain name registration
movement.3
Recently, commercial domain name parking, a means for
Internet advertising that exploits trademarks without the
mark owner’s consent,4 has emerged as a relatively easy way to

∗ J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B. 2003,
Cornell University. I would like to thank Timothy M. Kenny for insightful discussion in formulating the topic of this note and Kevin O’Riordan and Brian
Dawley for their advice and attention to detail. I also thank my family for
their steadfast support and enthusiasm in all facets of my life. Copyright ©
2007 by Elizabeth M. Flanagan.
1. The VeriSign Domain Report, DOMAIN NAME BRIEF (VeriSign, Inc.,
Mountainview, Cal.), at 2, http://www.verisign.com/static/042161.pdf.
2. See Brian Quinton, Google’s Parking Problem, DIRECT, Mar. 1, 2007,
at 50, available at http://www.directmag.com/opinions-columnists/websight/
marketing_googles_parking_problems (“[Domain name speculators] buy a domain name—some popular word or phrase ending in ‘.com’ that some portion
of the public may type into a browser navigation bar thinking they’ll find an
authoritative site . . . [but w]hat they get is a site full of pay-per-click ads,
sometimes with a little content but often not.”).
3. See Patrick Thobideau, Cybersquatting Can Yield Pay-Per-Click Bounties, COMPUTER WORLD, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1, available at http://www
.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=
289576.
4. Leslie Walker & Brian Krebs, The Web’s Million-Dollar Typos, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 2006, at F01 (relaying a law professor’s assertion that “the
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generate income.5 Domain name parking occurs when a domain
name registrant deposits its domain names with a registrar or
parking service provider who “creates placeholder pages and
then invites . . . Internet ad networks to fill them with ads” as
opposed to constructing a functional website.6 This scheme generates money when Internet surfers click on links to other websites advertised on the parked page.7 For every user’s click, the
advertiser indirectly pays the domain name registrant, an activity referred to as pay-per-click advertising.8
Imagine a consumer considering the purchase of a Cannondale® bicycle who may wish to research various Cannondale bicycle models. The consumer may directly visit
www.cannondalebikes.com,9 believing it to be a legitimate site
operated by Cannondale, the bicycle manufacturer. When the
web page loads, however, the consumer does not see the substantive website of the company that makes Cannondale bikes.
Instead, the consumer is confronted with a list of hyperlinks to
other websites unaffiliated with Cannondale, including links to
competitors’ websites, websites selling competitors’ products, or
shopping websites like ebay.com and shopzilla.com.10 The
practice amounts to someone making money off someone else’s trademark
without permission”).
5. Id. (revealing that Wall Street analysts estimate that close to half of
Google’s $6 billion 2005 revenue originated from ads on partner sites).
6. Id. Additionally, when Internet users arrive at the parked sites and
click on the advertisements, the Internet ad networks receive payment from
the advertisers and pass on a portion of the revenue to the domain name registrant. Id.
7. See, e.g., Bruce A. McDonald, Sites in Shadow: Typosquatters on the
Web Don’t Deserve the Mask of Anonymity, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2006, at
66–67, available at http://www.schnader.com/Newest_4_02/site%20Files/
nletters/pdf/McDonaldSitesShadow6-06.pdf (noting that third-party Website
owners pay online search engines like Google and Yahoo! to direct traffic to
their sites, and in turn pay the registrants of the parked pages); Go Daddy
Inc., Cashparking Service Agreement, https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/legal_
agreements/show_doc.asp?se=%2B&pageid=Cash%5FPark%5FSA (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007) (establishing GoDaddy’s parking payment policy).
8. Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Launches Enforcement Campaign
Targeting Web Site “Cybersquatters” Who Use Online Ads (Aug. 22, 2006),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2006/aug06/08-22domaindefense
.mspx.
9. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (“If a user knows
or can deduce the domain name associated with a Web Site, the user can directly access the Web Site by typing the domain name into a Web browser,
without having to conduct a time consuming search.”).
10. For another example of a domain name parking scheme, this time involving 1800Contacts.com, see Contracting the Internet: Does ICANN Create a
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parked domain, cannondalebikes.com, presents the consumer
with navigation options but fails to identify the intended target
of the consumer’s direct navigation attempt—Cannondale’s
bike-specific webpage: cannondale.com/bikes. This scenario is
just an example of the millions of parked domain names that
frustrate trademark owners and are encountered by consumers
on a daily basis.11
Domain name parking harms and annoys trademark owners and consumers. Mark owners are injured because unaffiliated domain name registrants can incorporate the owners’
marks into parked domain names, reducing the trademark
owner’s ability to control the use of their mark in cyberspace
and diverting consumers to competitors’ websites.12 Some
trademark owners have taken legal action to resolve these
problems and enforce their trademark rights. For example, Microsoft has filed suit against registrants of domain names it
claims are confusingly similar to Microsoft’s trademark.13
Moreover, advertisers who pay domain name parking service
providers to place their advertisements on websites do not like
being connected to potentially infringing parked domain
Barrier to Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business,
109th Cong. 63–76 (2006) (statement of Steven Delbianco, Exec. Director,
NetChoice) [hereinafter Delbianco Testimony].
11. See Frances Williams, Cybersquat Threat to Trademarks, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2007, at 11 (“According to [the World Intellectual Property Organization], companies that make a business of buying, selling and parking domain
names account for a significant share of the 120 [million] website addresses
registered worldwide. In addition, tens of millions of domain names are temporarily registered every month for ‘tasting,’ with only those names that generate significant traffic retained.”).
12. See Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (quoting Verizon Wireless’s
spokesman as condemning parking because those “sites are siphoning off traffic by tricking people who have tried to obtain information about Verizon
Wireless”); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 67 (“Trademark counterfeiters
often set up ‘parked’ Web Sites, which exist for no purpose other than to attract and redirect Internet traffic to other sites.”).
13. Complaint at 28, Microsoft Corp. v. Brown, No. CV06-5247 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 21, 2006) (“When a person looking for a Microsoft website lands on one of
Defendant’s Websites, that person may click on one of the advertisements or
hyperlinks on the site either because the person finds it easier to click on the
advertisement or hyperlink than to continue searching for the Microsoft site,
or because the person mistakenly believes Microsoft has authorized or endorsed the advertisements or hyperlinks. In either case, the person has been
diverted from the Microsoft website he or she was seeking to visit, and Microsoft has lost that opportunity to interact with that person.”); see also Gregg
Keizer, YOURKOMPANYNAME.COM—Typo-Squatter Landgrab, INFO.
WEEK, Aug. 28, 2006, at 15 (noting that Microsoft has filed two federal lawsuits regarding typosquatting).
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names.14 Internet consumers may also be misled or frustrated
by domain name parking activities when they seek out a
brand’s website but instead encounter a detour. Although an
infringing parked domain name may not appear individually
problematic, a broader view of the implications of domain name
parking reveals that trademark owners can neither singlehandedly stop this activity nor protect consumers from being
misled.
This Note discusses how commercial domain name parking
affects both trademark owners and consumers and suggests potential solutions regarding how those two groups may obtain
relief from this abusive practice. Part I explains the concept of
domain name parking and discusses the function of trademarks
in cyberspace. Part II discusses the tools trademark owners can
use to take legal action against domain name parking, including the Lanham Act, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), and indirect trademark infringement liability.
Part III suggests that the ACPA and the Lanham Act may provide an avenue of redress for trademark owners against domain
name registrants and parking service providers who, without
consent, profit from their mark. In practice, however, these statutes cannot rectify the effects of domain name parking on a
large scale because each trademark owner must individually
pursue the perpetrators of this infringing activity, and there
are significant practical obstacles and expenses in doing so.
Part III concludes by urging that, outside the general statutory
framework, the Federal Trade Commission should initiate lawsuits against registrants of parked domain names and domain
name parking service providers. Together, current trademark
law and FTC enforcement would allow trademarks to function
properly in cyberspace by permitting trademark owners to regain control over their marks and by protecting consumers
from unexpected and confusing detours.
14. Such advertisers are likely to contest concepts of unjust enrichment in
relation to commercial domain name parking. See Complaint at 34, Crafts by
Veronica v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-01985-JCL-MF (D.N.J. May 1, 2006),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/technology/documents/
yahoo_may2006.pdf (alleging harm because defendants placed ads “within
‘parking’ and other bulk registration sites” even though “Defendants
represented that Class Members’ ads would be shown in ‘popular, high-quality
sites’ . . . not second-rate content-less sites users only reach because they
guessed or misspelled a domain name”); see also McDonald, supra note 7, at 2
(describing litigation initiated by advertisers claiming that Google and Yahoo!
“collude with typosquatters to use infringing parked Web Sites as a means of
illicitly redirecting Internet traffic to the advertisers’ Web Sites”).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK FUNCTION IN
CYBERSPACE
Trademarks have been a hot commodity on the Internet
since its inception. Businesses and forward-looking individuals
sought to stake a claim on the web by registering valuable
trademarks as domain names.15 Part I first introduces the purposes underlying trademark law and sets forth the basic concept of commercial domain name parking. Part I then describes
the problems domain name parking presents for trademark
owners and Internet consumers.
A. PURPOSES UNDERLYING TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK LAW
In their most basic form, trademarks are valuable source
identifiers that help consumers quickly identify products and
differentiate between competing goods and services.16 Trademark law serves to maintain the function of trademarks in two
ways. Since “trademarks create an incentive to keep up a good
reputation for a predictable quality of goods,”17 trademark law
correspondingly protects a mark owner’s investment in the
quality of its mark and the corresponding goods and services.18
Second, trademark law aids consumers by ensuring the quality
of the brand information they receive and by preventing them
from being confused.19 When trademark owners bring suit
against alleged infringers, seeking the protections of trademark
law, trademark owners act not only in their own interest, but
also in the interest of consumers.20 The policies of protecting
the goodwill that trademark owners have developed through
the investment of time, effort, and money, and of preventing

15. H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting
Rights and Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301, 302–03 (2005)
(portraying the registration of domain names corresponding to valuable
trademarks as a “land rush”).
16. John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 154, 154 (2004) (listing the functions of trademarks).
17. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:4 (4th ed. 2007); see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 20 (4th ed. 2006).
18. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 2:4; see also Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 213 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress
enacted the Lanham Act ‘to secure trade-mark owners in the goodwill which
they have built up.’”).
19. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 20–21.
20. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 2:33; MERGES ET AL., supra note 17,
at 29–30.
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consumers from being confused, underscore the main premises
of trademark law.21
B. THE ESCALATING PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL DOMAIN NAME
PARKING
A domain name consists of a top-level extension like .com,
.org, and .net, preceded by a second-level extension, often a
trademark or a company name, which distinguishes one website from another.22 The benefit of the domain name system is
that each domain name is unique; the problem with the system
is that each domain name is registered on a first-come, firstserved basis.23 This arrangement may be a recipe for success
for some, but it can be disastrous for trademark owners.24
For trademark owners, the Internet provides a profitable,
but problematic, platform for business growth.25 Mark owners
often deal with numerous headaches inflicted by third parties,
often referred to as cybersquatters.26 Cybersquatting initially
embodied the practice of registering domain names consisting
of valuable trademarks and subsequently approaching the
trademark owners with demands for large payments to transfer
control of the domain name to the mark’s owner.27 For example,
notorious cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen made a business of registering “well known marks” and demanding payment from
the owners of the marks.28 Routine cybersquatting practices
quickly expanded to typosquatting, where a third party registers domain names similar to valuable trademarks but differ by
21. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–46 & n.13 (2007).
22. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir. 2004).
23. Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493
(2d Cir. 2000).
24. See Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Cybersquatting: Identity Theft in Disguise, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 277, 278 (2001) (“Cybersquatters typically victimize business entities . . . because the domain name has monetary value, regardless of whether the cybersquatter attempts to sell the domain name to the
business or entity or traffics in consumers on the Internet.”).
25. See Holland, supra note 15, at 308–09 (showing the exponential
growth rate of e-commerce transactions from 1999 to 2003).
26. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (outlining defendant’s registration of panavision.com and demands for money to “discontinue his ‘use’ of the domain name”), aff’d, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
27. See MICHAEL J. REMINGTON ET AL., CYBERSQUATTERS BEWARE:
TRADEMARK OWNERS ARE FIGHTING BACK 2 (2004).
28. Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1300.
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reflecting common typographic errors Internet users make
when attempting to reach a website via direct navigation.29 Typosquatting exemplifies a misuse of trademarks in cyberspace
that injures trademark owners with similar underlying profit
motives as traditional cybersquatting.30
Domain name parking incorporates the basic concepts of
cybersquatting and typosquatting: it exploits another’s trademark for commercial gain.31 Domain name parking can occur
when domain names are registered, but before a corresponding
website is constructed or operable.32 Rather than allowing the
domain name to lay idle, registrants may park domain names
pending site development in the short term. Alternatively, domain name parking can occur when domain names are registered for the express purpose of parking it to generate profits in
the long run.33 Internet users often reach parked web pages
when their direct navigation attempts fail due to an incorrect
guess at a domain name or because they commit typographical
errors. In those cases, domain name speculators position the
domain name at webpages filled with advertisements that distract Internets users from the websites they originally intended
to visit.34 In effect, “[s]urfing to these Web pages leads site visitors to a screen chock full of pay-per-click advertisements and

29. See Christopher G. Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003
and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1476, 1480 (2004) (describing typosquatting as the practice of “identifying legitimate popular web sites and purposefully registering deceptively similar or
deliberately misspelled domain names”).
30. See id. at 1481 (“[T]yposquatters also profit if owners of the legitimate
domain name are willing to purchase the deceptive domain name to prevent
further confusion.”).
31. See Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10, at 72 (“A ‘parked’ website is
one that closely resembles a popular domain name . . . . Based solely on traffic
generated by user errors, parking sites earn easy money when users click on
ads displayed on the page.”).
32. AllBusiness.com, Inc., Domain Name Parking Primer, http://www
.allbusiness.com/technology/internet-domain-names/3922-1.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2007) (“‘Parking’ means your registrar puts up a placeholder page at
your new Web address until you are ready to launch your new site.”).
33. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Domain Names Become Premium Web Real Estate, USA TODAY, May 10, 2006, at 3B (explaining the long-term investment
aspects of domain name parking).
34. Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (quoting an intellectual property attorney and professor who stated that “[i]f everyone has to spend a whole bunch of
time wading through all this look-alike crap online, then the value [of trademarks serving as source identifiers] for Internet consumers is going to be seriously reduced”).
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little meaningful content.”35 Thus, domain name parking obstructs key trademark law objectives by hindering a mark owner’s ability to indicate the single source of the goods or services
of the mark and impedes customers’ attempts to locate a desired website.
C. THE HARMS OF DOMAIN NAME PARKING
Trademark law protects mark owners’ intellectual property
rights and aids consumers in the marketplace.36 This Section
discusses mark owners’ motivations to contest domain name
parking that amounts to trademark infringement and explains
why consumers benefit from such enforcement activities.
1. Domain Name Parking Hinders the Ability of Trademark
Owners to Control Their Marks
Domain name parking creates both business and legal
problems for trademark owners.37 Because trademarks function
as source identifiers,38 often becoming part of consumers’ vernacular, domain names that include famous or well-known
trademarks are highly valued.39 Many Internet users who directly navigate the Internet reach websites by enclosing a wellknown trademark between “www.” and “.com.”40 Prudent businesses obtain domain names that conform to this formula in

35. Press Release, Microsoft, supra note 8.
36. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:1(B).
37. Ryan Kaatz & Julie Erin Land, Microsoft Files Federal Complaints to
Combat Extensive Trademark Infringement and Cybersquatting, MONDAQ
(Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=42844 (noting
that domain name parkers “allegedly profit from these domain names by diverting Internet traffic to websites containing advertisements and hyperlinks,
from which [they] receive advertising revenue and click-through payments
each time a misdirected Internet user clicks on one of the links”).
38. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734,
761 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
39. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (“[H]aving a known or deducible domain name is important to companies seeking to do business on the Internet, as well as important to consumers
who want to locate those business’ web sites.”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir.
1998).
40. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Because most businesses with a presence on the
Internet use the ‘.com’ top-level domain, Internet users intuitively try to find
businesses by typing in the corporate or trade name as the second-level domain . . . .”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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order to protect their trademark and its goodwill and to assist
their customers in finding their website quickly and easily.41
Domain name registrants target and incorporate trademarks into their parked domain names because the earning potential of parked domains increases when the domains exploit a
brand’s value.42 Contrary to and perhaps more troubling than
traditional cybersquatting, a registrant who parks a domain
name has little incentive to approach the trademark owner to
demand money in exchange for the transfer of the domain
name.43 When the registered domain name experiences a high
volume of traffic, the benefits of retaining the domain name
grow as the profits from the advertising revenue increase.44
The result is an enormous stockpile of parked domain names,
more detours on the information superhighway for Internet users and an illegitimate means of generating revenue from the
unauthorized use of another’s trademark.45
Trademark owners have strong incentives to protect their
marks and to stop infringing activities. If a trademark owner
does not vigorously monitor and take action against the unauthorized use of its mark, the mark may become legally weak
and even generic, the ultimate consequence of lax trademark

41. See id. at 953 (“In short, the exclusive quality of second-level domain
names has set trademark owners against each other in the struggle to establish a commercial presence on the Internet, and has set businesses against
domain name holders who seek to continue the traditional use of the Internet
as a non-commercial medium of communication.”); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5
(1999) (“The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic commerce, and the goodwill equity of valuable United States brand names, upon
which consumers increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods
and services on the Internet.”).
42. Cf. Kaatz & Land, supra note 37 (comparing the monthly deletion
rates of registered domain names in April 2005 and April 2006 and concluding
that a higher deletion rate corresponds to increased profitability and creates
incentives to acquire and hold on to high-traffic domain names and to discard
low-traffic domain names).
43. Cf. id. (“The trend of collecting and exploiting high-traffic domain
names is reflected in a dramatic increase in registrants or registrars tasting
. . . domain names for web traffic volume rather than registering them for
long-term web development.”).
44. See Clark, supra note 29, at 1489–90.
45. See Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10 (“[W]hen typos happen, legitimate businesses shouldn’t lose customers who fall into traps designed to
generate ad revenue. What’s more, the ad revenue generated by parking
drives up the price if the intended business tries to acquire the domain name
from the parking operator.”).
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enforcement.46 When a trademark becomes the common descriptive name of a type of product, rather than the original
trademark owner’s product, the trademark owner no longer has
exclusive rights to its use.47 As a result, the mark becomes “generic” since it no longer serves as a source-identifier.48 Therefore, many trademark owners find it prudent to police against
infringing domain name registrations by using third parties to
monitor and identify potential cybersquatters.49 Additionally,
because registrars do not scrutinize the domain name for potential trademark infringement before registering them, there
is a growing need for others to police newly registered domain
names.50 Aside from presenting concerns of weakening the
mark or genericide, infringing acts threaten a mark owner’s
ability to retain its customer base, potentially resulting in lost
customers and sales. As with all other forms of infringement,
trademark owners have an incentive to thwart domain name
parking activities that violate their intellectual property rights
and threaten their businesses.
2. Domain Name Parking Impermissibly Compounds
Consumer Confusion on the Internet
Domain name parking also presents concerns for Internet
users. Domain name parking can distract, confuse, and mislead
Internet users.51 While parked domains may benefit consumers
by providing options in the form of links to competitive or similar websites, the negative characteristics of parked domains
dominate. Just as the tangible effects of too-similar brand
names confuse consumers, a parked domain name misleads
46. When a trademark becomes generic, the trademark owner loses both
the exclusive right to its use and its investment in developing the mark’s
goodwill. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 154.
47. Id.
48. Id. Consider the former registered trademarks cellophane, aspirin,
and trampoline. Those trademarks once enjoyed legal protection, but after
rampant misuse by others—such as calling any dose of acetyl salicylic acid by
the tradename “aspirin”—and failure by the trademark owner to take appropriate enforcement measures, the trademark owner lost the federal registration for the mark, which could then be used industry-wide. See id. at 154–57.
49. See REMINGTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 31 (advocating third-party
monitoring to combat cybersquatting).
50. See Holland, supra note 15, at 307 (“[R]egistrars do not consider the
trademark significance of (or possible infringement resulting from) a particular registration.”).
51. Delbianco Testimony, supra note 10 (“Parking sites confuse and divert
potential customers.”).
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consumers into pursuing an undesired end. This is especially
true when the links offered on the parked page are described by
the trademark, but the official website of the trademark owner
does not appear.52 Consumers might follow any link whose description bears the same trademark they attempted to reach by
direct navigation.53 Thus, domain name parking can catch Internet consumers in a complex maze rather than aiding consumers, and it disrupts the underlying principles of trademarks.
II. PROTECTING TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE
Part I discussed the concept of domain name parking within the context of trademark infringement and explained the activity’s harms. Part II describes the enforcement mechanisms
available for trademark owners to challenge trademark misuse
in cyberspace. Those mechanisms include section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, the traditional statute used to combat trademark
infringement;54 the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, a discrete section of the Lanham Act directed towards preventing cybersquatting, a particular type of trademark infringement,55 and theories of contributory trademark infringement.
A. SETTING THE STAGE FOR TRADEMARK PROTECTION: THE
LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act56 provides federal protection for trademarks.57 The Act seeks “to ensure that ‘where the holder of a
trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to
the public [his] product, he is protected in his investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.’”58 The law prohibits others “from appropriating or copying them and taking ad52. See Walker & Krebs, supra note 4, at F01.
53. See Quinton, supra note 2, at 50.
54. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West Supp. 2007).
55. Id. § 1125(d).
56. Id. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141.
57. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of
“Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376–77 (2006) (explaining that
the “purpose of trademark protection is to foster competition” and that
“trademark law . . . does not convey monopoly rights . . . [r]ather, businesses
have ‘property’ rights in their trademarks only to the extent necessary to prevent unauthorized uses that cause a likelihood of consumer confusion”).
58. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777–78 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946)).
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vantage of the holder’s good will for their own benefit.”59 The
overall goal of the Lanham Act is to encourage competition, allocate resources, and create an incentive for mark owners to
improve and maintain product quality.60
To prevail on an infringement claim under the Lanham
Act,61 the plaintiff must prove that he has a valid mark,62 that
the defendant used the mark in commerce “in connection with
the sale . . . or advertising of goods or services,”63 and that the
mark was used in a manner that is likely to cause consumer
confusion.64 Section 1127 defines use in commerce as “the bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark,” and provides examples of
such use.65 A plaintiff that establishes these core elements may
be entitled to an injunction, as well as damages.66
1. It Is Critical to Establish a Likelihood of Consumer
Confusion in an Infringement Claim
In order to prevail on a trademark infringement claim, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s use of the mark is
likely to confuse an ordinary consumer as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.67 Courts generally consider several factors
in assessing whether the defendant’s use creates confusion, including, but not limited to, the strength or distinctiveness of
the plaintiff ’s mark, the similarity between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s marks, the proximity of the products, the existence
of actual confusion, the level of sophistication of the consuming
public, and the defendant’s intent in adopting the same or similar mark.68 The outcome of the confusion analysis generally
turns on the specific facts of the case.69
59. Id. at 777.
60. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 2:1–2:5 (explaining various policy
rationales underlying trademark law).
61. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406–
07 (2d Cir. 2005) (listing the elements of a trademark infringement claim under various sections of the Lanham Act).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (establishing liability for the infringement of registered trademarks); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (establishing liability
for the infringement of unregistered trademarks).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
64. Id.
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 2007).
66. Id. § 1125(c).
67. See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507,
2005 WL 1903128, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
68. See id.; REMINGTON ET AL., supra note 27, at 6–7; John Handy, Why
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The “initial interest confusion” doctrine allows a mark
owner to satisfy the likelihood of confusion requirement by demonstrating that a certain kind of confusion results from the
trademark’s use.70 Actionable initial interest confusion has
been defined as “customer confusion that creates initial interest
in a competitor’s product” that, “[a]lthough dispelled before an
actual sale occurs[,] . . . impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark.”71 While the initial interest confusion doctrine may be characterized as being “particularly applicable to the Internet,”72 not all federal courts of appeals have
adopted this stance.73
Even where evidence of confusion exists, courts may absolve a defendant from liability for trademark infringement if
the defendant shows that its use of the mark does not misappropriate the mark’s goodwill.74 A defendant may raise the
classic fair use defense when using the plaintiff ’s mark in conjunction with describing the defendant’s own product75 or when
the defendant uses the mark in its dictionary sense.76 The defendant may raise a nominative fair-use defense if the use of
the mark describes the plaintiff’s product but does not attempt
to exploit consumer confusion or transfer the goodwill associated with the mark to the defendant.77 Although fair use may
the Initially Confused Should Get a Clue: The Battle Between Trademark Infringement and Consumer Choice Online, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 567, 576 (2006).
69. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1903128, at * 3.
70. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1024–25 (9th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 1025.
72. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 764 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision)).
73. See, e.g., id. at 764 (discussing the failure of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit to acknowledge the initial interest confusion doctrine).
74. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543
U.S. 111, 120 (2004) (noting that the defendant need only raise this affirmative defense when the plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion by a
preponderance of the evidence); Handy, supra note 68, at 578.
75. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350,
352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a mechanic’s use of Volkswagen’s trademark
to describe his line of work does not constitute trademark infringement).
76. Handy, supra note 68, at 579 (“[A] farmer using the term ‘Apple’ to
describe his orchard cannot be held to infringe Apple Computer, Inc.’s trademark.”).
77. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding the defendant’s use of the Playmate trademark a permissible
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negate a claim of trademark infringement, establishing a likelihood of consumer confusion is necessary to prevail on a
trademark infringement claim.
2. The Lanham Act’s Early Utility in Cyberspace
In early cybersquatting cases, trademark owners sought
relief from infringing domain name registrants under the Lanham Act.78 For example, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 (FTDA), an amendment to the Lanham Act,79 was used to
hold cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen liable for trademark infringement.80 Cybersquatters, however, soon circumvented the
FTDA by not offering the domain name for sale in connection
with the sale of goods or services, which is required to implicate
liability.81 As a result, courts did not thwart the practice of cybersquatting because trademark law did not explicitly provide
relief from such activity for mark owners in cyberspace.82 As
the prevalence of cybersquatting increased, Congress further
amended the law to clarify trademark owners’ rights, to provide
for adequate remedies, and to deter cyberpiracy and cybersquatting.83
nominative fair use because “[t]here is no other way that [defendant] can identify or describe herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases”); Handy, supra note 68, at 579.
78. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1306
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that the defendant violated federal and state
trademark dilution statutes by “intentionally registering plaintiff ’s trademarks as his Internet domain names”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98,
109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp.
2007)).
80. Panavision Int’l, 945 F. Supp. at 1304 (“The Court finds that Toeppen’s conduct, which prevented Panavision from using its marks in a new and
important business medium, has diluted Panavision’s marks within the meaning of the statute.”). The FTDA provides remedies when plaintiffs prove their
mark is famous, the defendant uses the mark commercially, the mark was
famous before the defendant began using the mark, and the defendant’s use of
the mark dilutes the mark’s distinctive qualities. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).
81. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
82. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (“Instances of cybersquatting continue to
grow each year because there is no clear deterrent and little incentive for cybersquatters to discontinue their abusive practices. While the Federal Trademark Dilution Act has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters
have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now
take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability.”).
83. Id. at 7–8 (listing the findings of Congress in enacting the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)), including the need for legislation banning cybersquatting).
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B. A RESPONSE TO CYBERSQUATTING: THE ACPA
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)84
was Congress’s response to the inadequacies of conventional
trademark law in addressing cybersquatting. The ACPA provides a trademark owner with a cause of action against anyone
who, with a “bad faith intent to profit” from another’s mark,
“registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name” that is “identical
or confusingly similar to that mark.”85 The ACPA effectively
waives the commercial use requirement of a trademark infringement claim, forcing courts to focus on the registrant’s intent.86 The ACPA, however, fails to make mere registration actionable.87 Therefore, the possible defendants under an ACPA
claim are limited to the domain name registrant or its authorized licensee.88 Further, the remedies available under the ACPA are restricted to the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the mark’s owner.89
The ACPA lists nine factors that courts may use to evaluate the bad faith intent of the domain name registrant.90
Four factors support the defendant’s good faith registration: the
registrant’s rights in any marks incorporated into the domain
name, the extent to which the registrant is known by or associated with the marks, any prior bona fide use of the domain
name in connection with the registrant’s bona fide offering of
any goods or services, and whether there are any legitimate
noncommercial or fair uses of the mark on the site accessible
via the domain name.91 The remaining five enumerated factors
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d).
85. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
86. Adam Silberlight, Domain Name Disputes Under the ACPA in the New
Millennium: When Is Bad Faith Intent to Profit Really Bad Faith and Has Anything Changed with the ACPA’s Inception?, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 277 (2002) (“One major difference between traditional
trademark law and the ACPA . . . is that the ACPA does not require that the
domain name at issue be used in commerce.”).
87. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 957, 959 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that under pre-ACPA law a registrar’s
“acceptance of domain name registrations is not a ‘commercial use’”); see also
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
88. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(D). Even before the enactment of the ACPA,
courts absolved registrars from liability. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F.
Supp. at 959 (explaining that the registrar’s “acceptance of domain name registrations is not a ‘commercial use’ within the meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”).
89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
90. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX).
91. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2004).
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weigh against the defendant’s good faith intentions: the registrant’s intent to divert consumers from the true mark owner’s
online location, the registrant’s willingness to profit from the
sale, transfer, or assignment of the domain name, whether the
registrant provided false contact information during the registration process, the bulk registration of domain names incorporating others’ marks, and the similarity between the domain
name and a distinctive or famous mark.92 These bad faith factors are not exhaustive and allow courts to exercise discretion
on a case-by-case basis to determine the registrant’s intent.93
The ACPA proved a successful tool in combating one instance of domain parking in Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel.94
In Mattel, the defendant operated a commercial website, adventureapparel.com, at which he parked two domain names that
incorporated Mattel’s BARBIE® trademark, barbiesbeachwear.com and barbiesclothing.com.95 The court found that Mattel was entitled to summary judgment on an ACPA claim because the BARBIE mark in the defendant’s domain names
diluted the famous mark and was confusingly similar to the
distinctive Mattel mark.96 The court also found that the defendant demonstrated a bad faith intent to profit from the use of
the BARBIE mark.97 The court analyzed the nine ACPA bad
faith factors, and found that, on balance, the defendant exhibited the requisite bad faith.98 The court further held that
parking the domain names at the defendant’s commercial site
did not constitute fair use under the ACPA because the defendant did not show a protected, noncommercial use of the domain name.99
Although the district court quickly disposed of the domain
name parking at issue in Mattel by applying the ACPA, the defendant’s parking activities there are distinguishable from domain names parked solely to generate advertising revenue, the
92. See id. at 785–86.
93. See Clark, supra note 29, at 1498–99.
94. Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No. 00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001).
95. Id. at *1.
96. See id. at *2–3.
97. Id. at *5.
98. Id. at *3–5 (finding that the defendant did not attempt to transfer,
sell, or assign the domain name to Mattel or a third party, did not withhold
false contact information when registering the domain, and did register a
large portfolio of such domain names).
99. Id. at *5.
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focus of this Note. Rather than redirecting traffic to the registrant’s legitimate commercial website, commercially parked
domains present the Internet user with an abundance of advertisements and hyperlinks.100 Part III discusses whether the
ACPA would apply to a claim against a domain name registrant who parks his domain name for commercial profit.101
C. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN
CYBERSPACE
Trademark owners may also initiate suit against parties
that indirectly infringe their trademark rights. In the absence
of explicit statutory language, courts have developed theories of
contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, which originally applied to manufacturers and distributors of trademarked products.102 For contributory liability to attach, the defendant must either “intentionally induce[] another to infringe
a trademark” or “continue[] to supply its product to one whom
it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”103 Although the mere registration of domain
names including another’s mark does not amount to contributory infringement by the registrar,104 third parties other than registrars may be held accountable under theories of contributory
100. See id. at *1.
101. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
in partnership with the United States Department of Commerce, is the body
charged with managing the domain name system. See ICANN, Fact Sheet,
http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
ICANN has a dispute resolution policy separate from the United States’ federal statutes, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP),
pursuant to which trademark owners may file complaints against cybersquatters outside the United States federal court system. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/
policy.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). UDRP proceedings have determined that
domain name parking constitutes bad faith use. See, e.g., Beverages & More,
Inc. v. Glenn Soble, Case No. AF-0092 (eResolution, Mar. 9, 2000), http://
www.disputes.org/decisions/0092.htm (finding the defendant’s parking of a
confusingly similar domain name a bad faith use).
102. See Alicia Gámez, WhenU.com, Inc. & Google, Inc.: Parsing Trademark’s Use Requirement, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 403, 409–12 (2006) (tracing
the development of the indirect and contributory trademark infringement doctrines in case law).
103. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
104. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the defendant domain name registrar
would only be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it had an “affirmative duty to police the Internet for infringing uses” of the plaintiff ’s
trademark), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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infringement. In those situations, the defendant “must supply a
product to a third party with which the third party infringes [a
trademark].”105 When the defendant provides a service rather
than a product, the court will “consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s means of infringement.”106 Pursuing a theory of contributory infringement
against providers of domain name parking services remains a
possibility for trademark owners, but proving such a claim is
difficult.107
III. THE CURRENT TOOLS OF TRADEMARK
PROTECTION MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE
RELIEF FROM DOMAIN NAME PARKING
Against the backdrop of trademark law outlined in Part II,
Part III discusses the potential applicability of the ACPA and
Lanham Act to commercial domain name parking. By drawing
on the current state of trademark law in cyberspace, Part III
argues that trademark owners will likely find relief in the courtroom against domain name parking, but only on a piecemeal
basis. As such, present trademark law cannot efficiently address the domain name parking nuisance. Part III concludes by
considering an administrative mechanism to deter domain
name parking and provide consumers with relief.
A. THE ACPA IS MERELY THE FIRST STEP IN COMBATING
COMMERCIAL DOMAIN NAME PARKING
The ACPA provides a starting point for trademark owners
to combat the commercial domain name parking phenomenon
because the owner can initiate a suit directly against the domain name registrant.108 The ACPA is effective at stopping
traditional typosquatting because the ACPA protects marks incorporated into a domain name in a “confusingly similar” manner.109 It follows that, in cases of parked typo-domain-names
and domains utilizing a trademark along with other words, the
ACPA should provide relief.
105. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 194 F.3d at 984.
106. Id.
107. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806–07 (9th
Cir. 2007) (commenting on the difficulty of satisfying the test for secondary
trademark infringement and explaining the plaintiff ’s deficiency in pleading a
viable claim for contributory infringement).
108. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2007).
109. Clark, supra note 29, at 1499–1500.
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As discussed in Part II.B, a trademark owner must prove
the defendant’s “bad faith intent to profit” from the trademark
to prevail under the ACPA.110 In cases where the registrant
clearly participates in and receives payments from a commercial domain name parking program, the registrant’s intent to
profit is obvious.111 In determining whether the requisite bad
faith accompanies intent, one ACPA bad faith factor applies directly to commercial domain name parking activities: factor five
analyzes “the person’s intent to divert consumers from the
mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the
mark . . . for commercial gain.”112 Because Internet users often
incorrectly guess domain names, setting up a parked page that
anticipates an incorrect guess may demonstrate an intent to
divert consumers away from the mark owner’s site. Courts
should consider how long the registrant utilized the domain
name as a commercial parking device in the bad faith calculus.
The longer the parked domain name idles and generates revenues from click-through advertising, the less likely the registrant may credibly assert the fair use defense. To ascertain
whether the pay-per-click advertisements actually divert consumers and damage the trademark’s goodwill, courts may need
to look at the actual content of the page at which the domain
name is parked. If the links on the parked page advertise goods
related to those of the trademark owner, the court may find
that the registrant acted in bad faith based on his attempt to
free-ride off of the goodwill associated with the mark.113
On the other hand, the successful outcome of an ACPA
claim for domain name parking remains questionable. First, if
the advertised links lead to goods or services unrelated to the
trademark, it is less likely the court will consider the registrant
a free rider hoping to profit from the use of the trademark and
its goodwill. Second, domain name registrants generally do not
determine the contents of the parked page. Rather, the parking
service provider selects the page’s contents.114 Since the ACPA
110. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
111. For example, when a registrant has no plans to construct an operable
website, and instead receives advertising revenue from click-through traffic,
the registration of a trademark-infringing domain name appears illegitimate.
112. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Google, Inc., Google AdSense for Content, https://www.google
.com/adsense/static/en_US/AfcOverview.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (describing how the Google AdSense™ program “automatically deliver[s] text and
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does not explicitly provide comprehensive relief from entities
other than the domain name registrant,115 the trademark owner may be without recourse if it cannot demonstrate the registrant’s bad faith intent. Third, the ACPA’s safe harbor provision, which provides a safe harbor for registrants who “believed
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful,”116 may also
leave trademark owners without relief. For example, if cannondalebikes.com functioned as a forum for Cannondale fanatics to
share their thoughts on Cannondale bikes or if its content
amounted to a parody, the likelihood of a court imposing liability becomes unlikely.117 Likewise, when popular names or
trademarks are included within the domain name of a website
that advertises related products, a court may not provide relief
if it draws on comparative advertising principles.118
Regardless of whether the ACPA may provide relief to
trademark owners, the ACPA fails to efficiently remedy trademark owners’ concerns. It is expensive and time consuming for
image ads that are precisely targeted to your site and your site content—ads
so well-matched, in fact, that your readers will actually find them useful”).
115. Recall that the ACPA provides a cause of action against a person who,
with a bad faith intent to profit from the mark, registers, traffics in or uses a
domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A). In theory, the ACPA may be used directly against a
domain parking service provider since they are “using” a domain name for
profit. Yet this interpretation does not comport with congressional intent,
which was primarily directed towards prohibiting bad faith domain name registrations. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7–8 (1999).
116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
117. Cf. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359, 366–67 (4th Cir. 2001) (considering, but denying, the defendant’s
parody defense to allegations of trademark infringement). But see Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL
133313, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (holding that the First Amendment does not prevent injunctive relief against trademark misuse when the
use of that trademark is not part of a communicative message).
118. Clark, supra note 29, at 1500. Some courts are unwilling to automatically grant relief to a mark owner where the trademarked term is a “basic
element of the product.” Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513–14 (7th Cir.
2002). One court reasoned, “[w]e do not think that by virtue of trademark law
producers own their aftermarkets and can impede sellers in the aftermarket
from marketing the trademarked product.” Id. at 513. Note, however, that
when a domain name incorporating another’s mark is merely parked for the
purpose of generating revenue, the mark is not likely being used in a manner
consistent with a fair-use defense. Cf. Mattel Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No.
00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001) (“Though the
[parking of infringing domain names at the defendant’s website] was not egregious, it is clearly not the kind of fair use intended by the ACPA.”).
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trademark owners to tackle infringing, parked domain names
on a case-by-case basis.119 Moreover, the piecemeal, individualized approach of the ACPA does not permit a court to determine whether the broader act of commercial domain name
parking constitutes trademark infringement.
B. FILLING GAPS WITH THE LANHAM ACT: TARGETING DIRECT
INFRINGEMENT
Because the Lanham Act provides a cause of action against
anyone who misuses a trademark in commerce,120 its scope extends further than that of the ACPA. Accordingly, trademark
owners could seek broader relief against commercial domain
name parking service providers under the Lanham Act.
1. Pay-Per-Click Advertisements on Parked Domain Pages
Fulfill the Use Requirement
Under the Lanham Act, the trademark owner must prove
that the defendant uses its trademark in commerce.121 In the
Internet context, courts broadly interpret the use in commerce
requirement, lessening the plaintiff’s burden to explain why
the use is actionable.122 Under a liberal interpretation of “use,”
119. The ACPA may be more effective when the defendant is both the registrant and registrar. See McDonald, supra note 7, at 67 (explaining that domain name registrars register domain names “en masse” and own large portfolios of offensive domain names because their deep pockets enable them to pay
for the consequences of infringement, if found). However, the limited remedies
under the ACPA—forfeiture and cancellation of the domain name—do not constitute effective deterrents because registrants can turn around and continue
to register problematic domains. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp. 174
F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (considering the defendant’s use of the plaintiff ’s trademark as a metatag actionable “use”); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282–83 (D.N.J. 2006) (concluding that the
defendant’s acceptance of bids of others’ trademarks as keywords constituted
“use” under the Lanham Act); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSOnline.com, No.
Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006)
(“Based on the plain meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms
is a use in commerce.”); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp.
2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (permitting the plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action against search engine operators who allegedly “unlawfully used [plaintiff ’s] trademarks by allowing advertisers to bid on the trademarks and pay
defendants to be linked to the trademarks”). But see Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 400–01 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that defendant’s sale of plaintiff ’s mark as a keyword does not constitute “use” under
the Lanham Act); Merck & Co. Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, 425 F.
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domain name parking activities appear actionable against the
registrant and against providers of domain name parking services.123 Domain parking service providers offer to fill a web
page with targeted advertisements that relate to the trademark-incorporating domain name.124 As with the cannondalebikes.com example, parking service providers often allow domain names incorporating another’s trademark to serve as
parked pages. Thus, both parking service providers and domain
name registrants likely use a trademark in connection with a
commercial service as required to state a cause of action under
the Lanham Act.125
2. Satisfying the Confusion Requirement
Employing the initial interest confusion doctrine, the Lanham Act protects against the diversion of consumers’ initial interest.126 Just as courts applied the initial interest confusion
doctrine in cases involving the exploitation of trademarks as
metatags127 and search engines,128 the doctrine can apply to
trademark infringement that occurs with commercial domain
name parking.129 Initial interest confusion may occur because
Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that defendant’s purchase of
plaintiff ’s mark as a keyword for sponsored links is not “use” under the Lanham Act).
123. Cf. Edina Realty, 2006 WL 737064, at *3.
124. See, e.g., Google Inc., What Is AdSense for Domains?, http://www
.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (“AdSense for domains delivers targeted, conceptually related advertisements to parked domain pages
by using Google’s semantic technology to analyze and understand the meaning
of the domain names.”). But see Sedo LLC, How Do I Choose Keywords and
Personalize My Parking Page?, http://www.sedo.com/faq/index.php?action=
artikel&cat=26&id=319 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (giving domain name owners the ability to select advertising keywords to use in generating the links on
their parked pages).
125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
126. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1063.
127. See id. at 1065 (concluding that the Lanham Act precludes the use of
terms identical or confusingly similar to trademarks as metatags).
128. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1022–25 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the defendant’s practice of keying, which
“allows advertisers to target individuals with certain interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms,” presents a good argument for applying
the initial interest confusion doctrine). But see id. at 1034–35 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when
a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or
should know . . . that a . . . web link is not related to that of the trademark
holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.”).
129. But see Zachary J. Zweihorn, Searching for Confusion: The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine and its Misapplication to Search Engine Sponsored
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parking service providers fill parked pages with contextually
relevant advertisements, causing consumers to come across opportunities for redirection to unexpected websites. When presented with these options, consumers may try typing in another
domain name, or they may click-through to another website,
abandoning their initial destination.130 When the consumer decides to visit the competitor’s site rather than to continue to
seek the site originally intended, the mark owner is harmed.131
Assuming that the contents of the parked page relate to
the trademark incorporated in the parked domain name, it is
plausible that courts will find a high likelihood that initial interest confusion exists. It is unclear, however, whether consumers actually experience confusion when they arrive at a
parked page.132 Consumers may be unable to determine the relationship between the trademark used in the domain name
and the hyperlinks listed on the parked page.133 Parked pages
do not resemble the fully operative websites of most trademark
owners. Instead, they typically resemble search engine results
pages—a list of links with descriptions.134 Although savvy Internet users might recognize a parked page immediately, some
“[o]nline consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a geLinks, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1343 passim (2006) (arguing that the initial interest confusion doctrine no longer need be invoked in cyberspace).
130. But cf. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734,
746 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (explaining that Internet users can find relief from undesired webpages by returning to the previous webpage by clicking on a
browser’s “Back” button).
131. See id. at 764 (“[E]ven though the user knows she is not in the site initially sought, she may stay. In that way, the competitor has captured the
trademark holder’s potential visitors or customers.” (citing Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999),
aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision))).
132. Barrett, supra note 57, at 413 (“Internet users are accustomed to encountering multiple links on the websites they visit. There is no general expectation that linked and linking sites are part of a single or affiliated entity.
Permitting trademark owners to regulate use of their marks in connection
with links may disrupt the effectiveness of the Internet to provide a wide
range of information efficiently to users.”). But see Brookfield Commc’ns, 174
F.3d at 1057 (explaining how consumers who happen upon a competitor’s website in attempt to access the trademark owner’s website may realize they are
at a different site but may be content to remain there).
133. Cf. Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1022–27 (allowing the plaintiff ’s
theory of initial interest confusion based on the defendant’s use of the plaintiff ’s trademark in “keying” practices to go forward); Brookfield Commc’ns, 174
F.3d at 1056–58 (discussing forms of confusion the Lanham Act protects).
134. For a representative sample of parked pages under Sedo’s domain
name parking program, visit http://www.sedo.com/services/tour_parking.php
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
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nuine site from a pirate site, given that often the only indications of source and authenticity of the site . . . are the graphical
interface on the site itself and the Internet address at which it
resides.”135 Assuming, arguendo, that the use in commerce and
confusion elements are satisfied, trademark owners may also
seek redress against third parties for their role in facilitating
this infringing activity.
C. SPREADING THE BLAME: CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT BY
PARKING SERVICE PROVIDERS
Pursuing claims against the providers of domain name
parking services cuts to the heart of acts of trademark infringement facilitated by commercial domain name parking.136
Although such providers argue that their behavior does not
amount to trademark infringement because they refuse to extend parking services to infringing domain name registrants, in
practice it remains unclear whether those policies are enforced.137 Therefore, bringing suit against service providers
may deter their participation in this activity and encourage
them to enforce their policies.
A trademark owner could bring a contributory infringement claim against domain parking service providers, alleging
that they induce individuals to register and park domain
names that infringe well-known marks to generate profits from
pay-per-click advertising. Arguably, one domain parking service provider does just that by seeking out large domain name
portfolio owners to use its unique advertising program geared
towards parked domains.138 Parking service providers may use
technology that deciphers domain names to deliver contextually
relevant pay-per-click advertisements.139 Such continued delivery of targeted links to infringing domain names likely falls
135. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–5 (1999).
136. In some instances, the domain parking service provider and the domain name registrar are the same entity. For example, GoDaddy Software,
Inc., is a licensed registrar and also offers parking services to registrants. See
GoDaddy Software, Inc., About GoDaddy.com, https://www.godaddy.com/
gdshop/about.asp?se=%2B&ci=3802 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
137. Walker & Krebs, supra note 4 (noting that even Google’s trademark
lawyer admits that the software algorithms employed to detect trademark infringements are imperfect).
138. Google Inc., Maximize Revenue on Your Parked Pages with Google
AdSense for Domains, http://www.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
139. Id.
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within the purview of contributory infringement because the
parking service provider continues to supply products to those
it knows or has reason to know engage in trademark infringement.140
Further, some registrars permit domain name registrations to be retracted if within a certain window of time—known
as the “tasting” period—the domain name fails to generate sufficient traffic to make it a worthwhile investment.141 This
process allows final registration of “those domain names associated with well-known trademarks that receive hits during the
tasting period” and termination of those domain names that do
not generate sufficient volumes of traffic.142 The preregistration
tasting scheme presents a more implicit basis for imposing inducement liability on the registrar, both for domain name parking and traditional cybersquatting. Thus, where domain parking service providers undertake affirmative acts to influence
others to infringe a trademark, liability for contributory infringement may follow.143
The domain parking service provider exercises control over
the content of the web pages presented to consumers,144 which
implicates liability for contributory infringement.145 The park140. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); cf.
Heidi S. Padawer, Google This: Search Engine Results Weave a Web for
Trademark Infringement Actions on the Internet, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099,
1118–19 (2003) (explaining that search engines that sell trademarks should be
liable for contributory trademark infringement because the “search engine
would ‘know or ha[ve] reason to know’ of infringing conduct by those with
whom it contracts,” and acknowledging that, in this case, “the pay-forplacement model is the direct instrument that might facilitate a cunning website operator’s deviant attempt to lure consumers away from trademarked
sites by enabling him to buy those trademarked terms from the search engine”).
141. This practice, known as tasting, allows the preregistration of a large
number of domain names that are either deleted or registered depending on
the number of hits the domain name receives in a five-day period. McDonald,
supra note 7, at 67; see also Williams, supra note 11.
142. McDonald, supra note 7, at 67; Kaatz & Land, supra note 37.
143. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th
Cir. 2007).
144. This is the basis of Google’s AdSense contextual advertising program.
To participate, domain name registrants need only copy and paste a block of
html text on a web page. Google Inc., Google AdSense: Get Started in Minutes,
http://www.google.com/services/adsense_tour/page3.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
145. Perfect 10, Inc., 494 F.3d at 807 (“For liability to attach, there must be
[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to
infringe the plaintiff ’s mark.”).
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ing service provider generates advertisements that are displayed on the parked site using the trademark contained within the domain name.146 Although no manual involvement may
be required to generate the parked page’s content, the underlying algorithms used to match the advertisements to the infringing domain name nevertheless contribute to the provider’s liability.147 Because domain parking service providers incentivize
individuals to register and park infringing domain names and
control the content of the parked pages, trademark owners
should target enforcement activities against domain parking
service providers under theories of contributory liability.148
Trademark owners have several tools at their disposal to
challenge commercial domain name parking, directly and indirectly, in the courtroom. But, even though the self-help remedies trademark owners may invoke under the Lanham Act
could provide some relief from trademark infringement associated with commercial domain name parking, the Lanham Act
does not reach far enough. The infinite number of new domain
names available for registration and the deep pockets of many
infringers render the limited remedies available under the
ACPA and the broader Lanham Act ineffective deterrents.149
D. THE FTC SHOULD INITIATE SUITS AGAINST DOMAIN NAME
PARKING ACTORS TO PROVIDE CONSUMERS WITH RELIEF
Consumers, like trademark owners, experience the adverse
effects of domain name parking, including confusion, frustration, and, in extreme cases, fraud.150 This Section argues that
146. GoDaddy’s CashParking program uses Google’s AdSense technology to
generate pay-per-click parked pages. See Posting of Jennifer Slegg to JenSense: Making Sense of Contextual Advertising, http://www.jensense.com/
archives/2006/07/google_adsense_10.html (July 20, 2006, 12:21 EST).
147. Google Inc., Maximize Revenue on Your Parked Pages with Google
AdSense for Domains, http://www.google.com/domainpark (last visited Nov. 4,
2006); Sedo LLC, What Is Domain Parking? Earn Money While You Sleep!,
http://www.sedo.com/services/parking.php3?language=us (last visited Nov. 4,
2007) (describing how Sedo hosts websites and provides targeted ad links).
148. Cf. Padawer, supra note 140, at 1122 (“[P]ay-for-placement ushers in
unlitigated issues in trademark infringement, including probable extension of
the contributory infringement test.”).
149. Cf. Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the
World Is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39, 41 (2004) (undertaking an empirical analysis and concluding that “punitive damages play no meaningful role
in protecting consumers in cyberspace despite the epidemic of wrongdoing that
goes undetected and unpunished by public authorities”).
150. See, e.g., John Iwasaki, Third Deal in Spyware Case Defendant to Pay
$2,000 But Won’t Admit Guilt, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 7, 2006,
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administrative intervention is necessary to ensure that the
consumer protection principles underlying trademark law are
properly upheld.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is suited to challenge the negative consequences domain name parking inflicts
on consumers.151 The FTC has the power under section 5 of the
FTC Act to prevent “[u]nfair methods of competition . . . and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”152 For a practice to be deceptive, the practice must include a material representation or omission that is likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.153
The FTC can bring suit in federal district court to enjoin the violation of any law it enforces.154 More broadly, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) protects consumers against
unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices by conducting investigations, initiating lawsuits, and educating consumers about
their rights.155
In the past, the FTC has addressed concerns about practices analogous to domain name parking. The FTC brought suit
against John Zuccarini, a cybersquatter, for violating section 5
of the FTC Act because he undertook a “concerted course of activity involving the redirecting of consumers from their intended destinations on the World Wide Web to his own Web
pages” and trapped consumers in a series of Web pages displaying advertisements for his own financial gain.156 The district
at B5 (explaining how the defendant deceived consumers by fraudulently affiliating his business with Microsoft, leading consumers to click on his hyperlinked advertising and purchase non-Microsoft products).
151. “The FTC focuses on stopping actions that threaten consumers’ opportunities to exercise informed choice.” Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (2002) (statement of Howard
Beales, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n). But see
Rustad, supra note 149, at 80 (“The FTC is the most active Internet enforcer,
but even this pro-active agency lacks the necessary resources to patrol cyberspace.”).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). The FTC Act was amended in 1938 to declare “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” illegal. Act of Mar. 21,
1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111.
153. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984) (appending the FTC Policy Statement on Deception of Oct. 14, 1983 to the majority decision).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
155. See About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
about.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
156. F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A 01-CV-4854, 2002 WL 1378421, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2002); see also F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 01CV4854, 2001 WL
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court found that Zuccarini’s practice of redirecting and obstructing consumers was “likely to cause substantial injury”
and was “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.”157 The district court defined “redirecting”
as “the practice of diverting consumers to Web sites . . . that
consumers did not intend to visit or access, using tactics including . . . operating, publishing, or disseminating Web sites or
pages with domain names that are confusingly similar to famous trademarks, service marks or names.”158 Zuccarini was
permanently restrained from redirecting consumers on the Internet and “[r]epresenting that . . . domain names . . . are endorsed by, or affiliated or associated with, any third party or
any entity, including . . . any Web site . . . [or] trademark . . .
when in fact they are not.”159
Domain name parking is highly analogous to Zuccarini’s
practice of “redirecting” Internet users and is the type of activity the FTC should seek to prevent. Domain name parkers, like
Zuccarini, use cybersquatting and typosquatting tactics to register domain names similar to well-known trademarks. They
both then prey on Internet consumers who mistakenly enter
those domain names in their Internet browsers by presenting
the consumers with websites that were not their intended destination. Finally, whereas Zuccarini trapped Internet consumers in a web of pop-up advertisements, commercial domain
name parkers trap Internet consumers in a maze of pay-perclick advertisements. Although Zuccarini’s trapping tactics may
appear more egregious than listings of pay-per-click advertisements, both schemes are designed to frustrate consumers and
provide the bad actor with profits. Because the effects of and
methods of implementing these two schemes markedly parallel
one another, the FTC should draw upon the Zuccarini case to
proceed against infringing domain name parkers.
Analogously, the FTC has also used its enforcement powers
to address spyware, which is “software that monitors computer

34131411, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2001) (granting a temporary restraining
order against Zuccarini for “engag[ing] in a concerted course of unlawful activity involving the redirecting of consumers from their intended destinations on
the . . . Web to his own Web pages, where he traps consumers in multiple series of Web pages”).
157. Zuccarini, 2002 WL 1378421, at *1.
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id. at *4–5. Zuccarini was also ordered to pay $1,897,166 in equitable
relief. Id. at *5.

526

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:498

usage without a user’s knowledge or consent.”160 Spyware is
problematic, in part, because it enables third parties to capture
sensitive personal information, posing risks to privacy and perpetrating fraud.161 The FTC has filed suit against purveyors of
spyware, alleging, for example, that they deprive consumers of
their right of consent and control in software installation.162
The FTC also initiated suit against “various segments of the
spyware industry, including adware developers and distributors, individual advertising/distribution affiliates and intermediate advertising/distribution affiliate networks.”163 Notably,
the FTC brought suit against advertising affiliates that derived
revenues for disseminating pop-up advertisements.164 The FTC
alleged that “providing the means and instrumentalities for the
commission of deceptive and unfair acts and practices” violated
section 5 of the FTC Act.165
Although all of the FTC’s spyware suits settled,166 precluding a decision on whether spyware constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act, these
cases shed light on how the FTC may proceed against domain
name parking activities. First, the FTC’s allegations against
advertising affiliates largely parallel causes of action for contributory trademark infringement.167 The FTC may therefore
be willing to proceed against domain name parking service providers for their role in perpetuating this type of trademark infringement and misleading consumers in cyberspace. Second,
settlements reached between the spyware defendants and the
FTC are instructive as to the types of relief consumers and
trademark owners can anticipate. For example, the FTC set
160. Liying Sun, Who Can Fix the Spyware Problem?, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 555, 555 (2007).
161. Id. at 556–57.
162. Id. at 570.
163. Id. at 572.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 572–73.
166. Id. at 574.
167. Id. at 573. “[T]he FTC alleged that [the adware vendor] had violated
the FTC Act because it . . . knew or should have known that its affiliates had
retained numerous third-party sub-affiliates to install its adware . . . and . . .
had committed, through affiliates and sub-affiliates acting on its behalf and
for its benefit, various deceptive and unfair software installations and operations.” Id. Contributory trademark infringement requires that the defendant
“continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
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“strict guidelines” on one spyware defendant’s future practices
and made clear that the defendant would be responsible for affiliates acting on its behalf in the future.”168 Even if domain
name parking suits result in settlements, such settlements will
likely carve out relief for consumers and trademark owners,
and begin to clean up cyberspace.
Additionally, suits brought by the FTC against domain
name parkers offer several advantages over suits initiated by
trademark owners. First, the FTC can, in one action, proceed
against actors who park portfolios of domain names that infringe several different trademarks. Whereas trademark owners are limited to challenging activities that solely affect their
trademark rights, the FTC can more broadly challenge infringing activities because they are not limited by intellectual property rights. Rather, the FTC can proceed against any actor that
parks infringing domain names to generate pay-per-click advertising revenue. Thus, the FTC is especially positioned to
proceed against en masse domain name registrants, more
quickly reaching the roots of the domain name parking problem. Second, the FTC’s section 5 enforcement powers are much
broader than trademark owners’ counterpart, the Lanham Act.
Whereas a Lanham Act plaintiff must prove use in commerce
and a likelihood of confusion, the FTC need only show that domain name parking is an unfair or deceptive practice, which
covers a broad range of activity.169 Third, where the FTC prevails, the monetary relief awarded by the court goes back to
consumers, whereas suits initiated by trademark owners afford
relief only into the plaintiff’s hands.170 For these reasons, the
FTC is a powerful and appropriate body to investigate the adverse affects of domain name parking on consumers in cyberspace.
CONCLUSION
Beyond serving as an additional conduit for generating advertising-related profits in cyberspace, commercial domain
168. Sun, supra note 160, at 574.
169. Deborah Platt Majoras, The Federal Trade Commission: Learning
from History as We Confront Today’s Consumer Challenges, 75 U. MO. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 115, 130 (2006).
170. Id. at 125–26 (“Almost from its inception, this [consumer protection]
program has proved an effective tool not only to obtain court orders halting
fraudulent schemes, but also to obtain consumer redress and other potent
equitable remedies.”).
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name parking creates another motivation for the registration of
domain names identical to or confusingly similar to trademarks. The implications of this practice are far-reaching. So
long as the domain name parking trend continues, the likelihood that consumers stumble upon parked pages and are diverted from a trademark owner’s website increases. For trademark
owners,
commercial
domain
name
parking
misappropriates a mark’s goodwill, lessens the mark’s sourceidentifying capacity and potentially erodes a mark owner’s customer base. Current trademark law may provide the flexibility
to appropriately confront the trademark infringement caused
by domain name parking.171 But trademark law cannot broadly
address the harms domain name parking inflicts on consumers.
Administrative involvement, through the FTC, is needed to
prevent continued frustration, misunderstanding, and chaos on
the information superhighway.

171. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp. 174 F.3d 1036,
1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when
applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”).

